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Abstrakt 
 
Det har forskats mycket kring företagsförvärv och fusioner, både om vad orsakerna 
är för företag att fusioneras, och hur bra resultat fusionerna ger. Största delen av 
undersökningarna har dock fokuserat enbart på stora publika aktiebolag. Syftet med 
detta arbete var att undersöka ifall orsakerna för fusioner är de samma för små 
företag i mjukvaruindustrin, som för stora företag, samt hur bra resultat dessa 
fusioner ger. För att få svar på dessa frågor har jag studerat en fusion mellan två 
privatägda små mjukvaruföretag i Finland. Jag genomförde studien som en fallstudie 
där jag samlade in information genom semi-strukturerade intervjuer, olika 
presentationsdokument, bokslut samt frågeformulär. Intervjuerna gjordes med 
ledningen och styrelsen för de båda företagen, dessa utgjorde tillika de största 
aktieägarna. Alla intervjuer spelades in och transkriberades för analys. 
 
Det visade sig att orsakerna till fusion är till stora delar de samma för små företag 
som för stora, med den skillnaden att små privatägda företag inte deltar i fusioner på 
grund av ledningens hybris eller för att företagsledningen vill öka sin egen makt. 
Detta beror på att ledningen vanligen också är de största aktieägarna och därmed 
inte vill verka mot aktieägarnas intressen. 
 
I detta fall lyckades fusionen, till stor del på grund av att valet av förvärvsobjekt var 
lyckat. En del av potentialen i fusionen förlorades dock i och med att utförandet av 
fusionen inte var tillräckligt bra planerad. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter details the motivation for this case study and the objectives for it; 
it also explains the selection of companies for this case study and describes how 
the data was collected. 
1.1  Background 
Mergers and acquisitions have long been a very interesting research topic and a 
lot of studies have been conducted on the reasons for them, how they should 
be executed and how successful they are. The vast majority of the studies have 
focused on large, public companies where the acquisitions have valuations of 
hundreds of millions, or billions, of dollars or euros. A substantial number of all 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A’s) are, however, done by small and medium 
sized companies that are privately owned. As the owner base and resources of a 
small company differs substantially from a large company, one cannot directly 
apply the results acquired from studies of large company mergers on small and 
medium sized companies. The differences between privately held and public 
companies are also quite large and these also affect M&A behavior.  
Research on mergers and acquisitions have often focused on how successful 
they are, and on the problems that arise when trying to capture the sought after 
benefits of the merger. Almost all of the potential problems a merger can face 
have to do with employee satisfaction; if the people working at the merging 
companies are not happy with the merger, it is not very likely that the merger 
will be a success. While employee satisfaction is a big deal in all mergers, it is 
tremendously important in a merger where the companies’ core assets are the 
knowledge their employees possess. In companies working in traditional 
industries a very large portion of the company’s value lies in its production 
facilities and distribution channels, and it is usually these an acquiring company 
is buying. For a small software company that does not have a strong brand 
name or products with a strong lock-in effect, the only value of the company 
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stems from its employees. If these employees are dissatisfied with the merger 
and choose to quit it might very well lead to the collapse of the company.  
With these special considerations in mind, the research questions this study 
seeks to answer are: 
 What are the reasons for small software companies to merge? 
 How well is the desired merger results achieved? 
1.2 Research methods 
The study was conducted as a case study on the merger of Nordic Solutions Oy 
and Ravensoft Oy, which were both privately held small companies in the 
software industry. According to (Gillham, 2000a) a case is: 
 a unit of human activity embedded in the real world; 
 which can only be studied or understood in context; 
 which exists in the here and now; 
 that merges with its context so that precise boundaries are difficult to 
draw. 
Gillham states that a case study investigates a case to answer specific questions 
by using different kinds of evidence because no single source of evidence is 
likely to be sufficient on its own. The use of several different evidence sources is 
a key characteristic of a case study; another distinguishable feature is that you 
do not start out with predefined theories which you seek to prove or disprove, 
because until you have examined the data you do not know what theories will 
work best. (Bryman, 2007) also mentions the usage of multiple sources of 
evidence as an advantage of case studies when it comes to acquiring a better 
understanding of a phenomenon. 
In a guide aimed at helping researchers construct questionnaires, Gillham 
discusses different ways of collecting verbal data from people,  placed on a 
structured-unstructured scale ranging from just listening to other people talk in 
the unstructured end to having people fill out structured questionnaires in the 
structured end. While structured questionnaires are an easy way to get data 
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from many people that is fairly easy to analyze, it seldom is enough to base the 
whole case study on, and other research methods must supplement this. In the 
middle of the structured-unstructured scale lies semi structured and open-
ended interviews, with which you can get more detailed and in-depth data, but 
at a much higher cost in the sense of time spent on collecting data as well as 
analyzing it, compared to using questionnaires. (Gillham, 2008) 
Another guide by Gillham focuses on doing research interviews, in which he 
details everything from how the interviewer should sit while interviewing to 
how to summarize and write up ones findings. It is very important to transcribe 
all of the interviews, if it is only possible. This helps lessen the risk of 
interviewer bias, in which the person interviewing tends to remember and 
emphasize the answers he or she was hoping for. The drawback with 
transcribing interviews is that it takes a lot of time; therefore one should either 
try to limit the length of each interview, or limit the number of interviews done. 
One special category of interviews is the “elite” interview, in which the 
interviewee is an expert in his or her field and usually also in a position of 
power. These types of interviewees have a great deal of important knowledge, 
and might also know how which questions you should be asking and how to 
categorize your answers. Elite interviewees can be very important for your 
research. (Gillham, 2000b) 
The case study method was chosen as it enabled me to get detailed data on this 
specific merger. The data was collected at the merged company Nordic 
Solutions Oy (later Attido Oy), were I worked. As (Stake, 1995), points out, one 
single case study is rarely the most representative case for other cases, but he 
also states that sometimes the researcher’s choice of case companies can be 
limited and therefore the researcher must choose a company to which he or she 
has access to, by, for example, working there. 
Most of the data collected was gathered by interviewing the shareholders of 
both merging companies, which were also working for the company, or a 
member of the board. The interviews were conducted between December 2012 
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and May 2013 and they were recorded and transcribed. Because these 
interviews were done two years after the merger of the companies there might 
have been some recall bias in the reasons and goals for the merger, and 
consequently, the actual results may be stated as original goals for the merger. 
However, one preliminary interview with the CEO of Nordic Solutions was done 
before the actual merger (but after the merger deal was made) and some early 
presentation documents also exists which provides reliable data on the stated 
intentions at the time of the merger. 
I used semi structured interviews which means that I had prepared interview 
guides beforehand, but that during the interviews I sometimes had to change 
the order or phrasing of the questions depending on the answers given by the 
interviewee. The interview guides I used were written in Finnish, and the 
interviews were conducted in the respondent’s mother tongue, which was 
Swedish in one case, and in the other cases Finnish. The interviewees were 
chosen so that for each company, the interviewed people represented over 50% 
of the shares in the company. In Ravensoft’s case they represented about 66% 
of the shares, and in Nordic Solutions case they represented about 70% of the 
shares. As some of the shareholders at the time of the merger were no longer 
working at the company, and all of the shareholders had very busy schedules, it 
was not possible with reasonable effort to interview all of them. By focusing on 
the largest shareholders I could ensure that I captured the opinions of the most 
influential persons, which, at the same time, where the people that had the 
most to win or lose from the merger. The interviewed persons owned 72% of 
the merged company, and worked in four different management layers, which 
make them representative for the company as well as for the owners of the 
company. The respondents answered most of the questions, but details about 
the merger deal and payment were not given. 
The people I interviewed held the following positions in the companies:  
 Antti Piippo, chairman of the board, Nordic Solutions 
 Pasi Matsi, CEO, Nordic Solutions 
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 Marko Voutilanen, executive vice president, Nordic Solutions 
 Jari Laurila, CEO, Ravensoft 
 Patrik Rosqvist, manager, Ravensoft 
Aside from the interviews and presentations, numeric data was gathered by 
studying the annual reports of the companies as well as charts presenting the 
revenue per customer. In the year following the merger, there were also some 
questions in the yearly employee satisfaction survey regarding the merger on 
how the employees felt that the merger had been conducted and if they felt 
that they belonged to the same company. 
As the purchase deed for the merger was confidential, I was not able to use it as 
a source of information for the case.  
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2 Theoretical background 
In this chapter I review some of the previous research in the mergers and 
acquisitions field; why they are done, how researchers have tried to measure 
their results, and what the most common pitfalls are when merging two 
companies. 
2.1 Reasons for mergers 
Mergers and acquisitions are carried out for a variety of reasons. According to 
(Trautwein, 1990) there are seven different theories about why mergers occur. 
Efficiency theory considers the reason for mergers to be the desire to achieve 
synergies by combining the resources of the two merging entities. The types of 
synergies that are usually hoped to be gained are financial synergies, 
operational synergies and managerial synergies. 
Monopoly theory assumes the mergers aim is to create more market power. 
One possibility is that the firm can use earnings from one product to sustain a 
less profitable one while fighting for market shares. Another possibility is that 
the firm can compete against a competitor on several markets simultaneously 
after a merger. The firm can also try to deter possible competitors from 
entering its market by a concentric acquisition. 
Valuation theory suggests that mergers are carried out when managers of the 
acquiring firm have better information on the targets value than the market. 
The bidder then aims to capitalize on this private knowledge after the merger.  
Empire building theory also focuses on the managers of the bidding company. 
This theory, however, assumes that managers do not necessarily act in the best 
interest of their shareholders, but instead plan mergers to maximize their own 
influence. 
Process theory describes mergers not as results of rational choices, but as 
outcomes of processes influenced by organizational routines, political games or 
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by the limited processing powers of individuals. This theory is, however, only 
rudimentarily developed. 
A sixth theory is the raider theory which hypothesizes that the raider who buys 
the company transfers value from the acquired company and its shareholders to 
himself and his company. According to Trautwein, the evidence on shareholders 
gains does not support this theory. 
The last of Trautwein’s theories is called the disturbance theory. According to it, 
mergers happen in waves which are caused by economic disturbances that 
change the valuations of assets among owners and non-owners. This causes the 
owners to sell their companies and non-owners to acquire them. 
(Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993) name three major motives for mergers: the 
synergy motive, the agency motive, and hubris. Of these three the first two are 
also discussed by Trautwein. The third motive, the hubris motive, resembles 
Trautwein’s process theory in that they both assume that managers are unable 
to correctly assess the possible benefits of mergers, and therefore they do not 
make rational decisions. Even so, the hubris theory only focuses on one 
outcome of bad information or bad decision making and the overestimation of 
synergy gains. Berkovitch and Narayanan also suggest that management only 
engage in takeovers when it overestimates synergy gains. If synergy gains are 
underestimated but still considered enough to accomplish the takeover I see no 
reason why management would not conduct the takeover. 
(Kreitl & J.Oberndorfer, 2004) have studied merger reasons for a specific type of 
companies, namely engineering consulting firms. As Kreitl and Oberndorfer 
state, engineering consulting firms are characterized by their emphasis on highly 
skilled personnel instead of machinery and equipment, and by their orientation 
towards projects. These characteristics also fit the software industry very well 
and therefore I think that the results Kreitl and Oberndorfer have acquired also 
can be applied to mergers in the software industry. In their study, Kreitl and 
Oberndorfer acknowledge the efficiency theory, the monopoly theory and the 
hubris theory from previous literature. They also mention that (McCann, 1996) 
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found that professional service firms ranked the acquisition of expert talent as a 
very important motive for mergers. 
Kreitl and Oberndorfer found that the most important reason for M&A’s for 
engineering consulting firms was the penetration of new service/client markets. 
The second most important reason was increasing market share, or market 
power. Having a larger market share means that the project oriented company 
has more references and a higher availability of professionals for future project 
and thus it can better compete for new projects. A large market share also 
brings cost reduction because of increased efficiency in the design process that 
comes from experience. A stronger market power also provides the company 
with a reputation for its expertise. 
Other important merger motives were the acceleration of the firm’s growth and 
the acquisition of expert talent. Increasing firm size can also help retain expert 
talent as a larger firm creates the possibilities to promote junior managers. For  
a small company the acquisition of experts can be a very important reason  for a 
merger as it can be very difficult to recruit specialists if the company name is 
not known. 
 
2.2 Mergers in the IT industry 
(Leger, 2009) has studied how the merging companies’ product portfolios affect 
the post-merger performance. His study focused on how product portfolio 
complementarity and compatibility affected short-term market performance, 
transaction value, and the new entity’s financial performance after the merger. 
Product portfolio complementarity is defined as how well the two firms’ 
products joint use adds more value for the customer than the separate use of 
the same products. Software compatibility is the degree of how well programs 
can work together and share data. 
Leger found that a higher degree of product portfolio compatibility increases 
short-term market performance, transaction value, and the new entity’s 
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financial performance of the merger. Product portfolio complementarity, on the 
other hand, does not affect the above mentioned measurements positively. For 
transaction value the results for portfolio complementarity were inconclusive, 
but both financial performance and short-term market performance seems to 
be negatively affected by a high degree of product portfolio complementarity. 
Leger states that the most important finding in his study is the positive 
influence product portfolio compatibility has on merger results. This means that 
it is very important to consider the technologies used in the acquiring and the 
target company when evaluating a possible merger. 
In an article discussing three case-studies on software company mergers 
(Ahonen, 2006) examined the reasons for the mergers in each of the cases. In 
two cases the most important reason for the acquisition was to strengthen the 
product portfolio of the acquiring company. In one case the acquired company 
was the technology leader in its field and in the other the acquired company 
had products that were sold as part of the systems provided by the acquiring 
company. In the third case the main rational for buying the target was getting 
rid of competition and acquiring the customer base of the target company.  
 
2.3 Merger performance 
2.3.1 Measuring merger performance 
A lot of the studies on mergers and acquisitions have focused on the 
performance and profitability of mergers. Studies have tried to answer the 
questions of whether mergers create overall value and whether mergers create 
value to the acquirer. To answer these questions several different metrics have 
been used. The most commonly used metric is to compare changes in stock 
prices both for the acquiring company and the target company. This method has 
an advantage in that the data required for analyses is easily available, and it is 
also a less biased method compared to methods requiring interviews (Lubatkin, 
1987). In a comparison study, (Schoenberg, 2006) has compared the results 
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gained from four different metrics. These were: cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR), managers’ assessments, divestment data and expert informants’ 
assessments. Independently each of these metrics suggests that about 50 % of 
all mergers are successful. When comparing performance data generated from 
the different metrics of the same cases positive correlation could only be found 
between managers’ and expert informants’ assessments. A single merger could 
thus be considered both failed and successful depending on the metrics used. 
To overcome the previously mentioned problem Schoenberg suggests using 
multiple measures to determine if a merger is successful. In addition to the four 
previously mentioned metrics he also considers long-term accounting measures 
for evaluating merger success. One such measure is ROA (Return On Assets) that 
(Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, & Best, 1998) uses in their study of the attributes of 
successful and unsuccessful mergers. Papadakis and Thanos (Papadakis, 2010) 
have later tried to replicate and extend Schoenberg’s study in a different 
geographical setting. They compared the results for merger performance gained 
by one stock based metric, CAR, one accounting based metric, ROA, and one 
perceived performance based metric, manager’s subjective assessments. Their 
results were similar to Schoenberg’s in the sense that they found no correlation 
between the results from the different metrics. 
2.3.2 Acquirer returns 
It is often stated that the majority of mergers fail to achieve the desired results. 
This statement is based on the fact that earlier research on whether mergers 
create value has concluded that mergers more often than not do not result in 
positive long-term performance for the acquirer (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2000). The 
study conducted by (Franks, 1991) is mentioned as a milestone in M&A 
literature because of their new measurement techniques. Although they did not 
find that mergers cause negative returns to the acquirer, Agrawal and Jaffe 
found that all the research after Franks’ showed acquirer under-performance 
after mergers. More recent studies have, however, suggested that acquirers do 
not overpay when buying targets. Such results have been found by (Bhagat, 
2005) using new methods for estimating value improvements. (Fuller, 2002) also 
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found evidence of positive acquirer returns when examining firms that acquired 
five or more public and non-public targets within a short time period. 
In their study, Fuller et. al. studied how the type of the target firm (public, 
private or subsidiary) affected the acquirers gains and also how the payment 
type (stock, cash or mixed) affected the returns. Fuller et. al. found out that 
acquirers of private firms and subsidiaries on average fare better than acquirers 
of public firms. One reason for this is that bidders receive a better price due to 
the lack of liquidity of an investment in a subsidiary or in a private firm. There 
are also two other important factors that can affect the returns to the acquirer 
of a private firm positively. Because a private firm by definition is owned by only 
a few persons or even a single person there is a considerable chance that if the 
acquisition is paid with stock and the acquired firm’s size is comparable to the 
acquiring firm a large new blockholder will be created. A new large blockholder 
allows greater monitoring of the acquirer’s management which increases the 
value of the acquirer. Acquiring a private firm with stock also has another 
positive influence on the bidder’s returns. If a private firm is bought with cash 
its owners face immediate tax implications but if they instead receive stock they 
can defer the tax. If this is valuable to them they might accept a discounted 
price for their firm. (Fuller, 2002) 
In addition to using conventional methods for estimating abnormal stock 
returns, Bhagat et. al. have used two new methods. The first method is called 
the probability scaling method, the probability scaling method uses the returns 
associated with the bid announcement from a short time frame and scales the 
returns upward to account for the probability that the bid will fail. The other 
method is called the intervention method, this method captures stock returns 
associated with intervening events such as competing bids. By using these new 
methods in conjunction with conventional methods, Bhagat et. al. have found 
that acquirers on average pay a fair price for the shares in the target companies. 
The estimated value improvements are larger when competing bids are involved 
than in cases where there is only one bidder.(Bhagat, 2005) 
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Here it is worth noting that even though the study by Bhagat et. al. seems to 
show that more mergers are indeed successful than what was thought 
previously it is only a new interpretation of share prices. This means that 
investors have valued mergers more than previously thought which means that 
mergers are on average profitable for the acquirers’ shareholders.  
Capron and Shen studied the acquisitions of private vs. public targets and the 
returns to the acquirers. Overall it seems that acquirers profit more from buying 
private targets than from buying public targets. This is due to the fact that 
buying private companies is more risky than buying public ones because they 
lack a market price. Small private companies also have a more limited sample of 
potential acquirers. One particularly interesting finding was that it seems that 
acquiring firms that bought a public company fared better than if they would  
have bought a private company, and at the same time companies that bought 
private firms fared better than if they would have bought public firms. This can 
be explained by the fact that acquirers usually favor private targets when 
acquiring targets in their own industry and public targets when extending into 
more unknown industries.  (Capron, 2007)  
2.3.3 Target returns 
Almost all of the research on target returns from mergers has indicated that the 
merger or acquisition target benefits from the transaction (Agrawal & Jaffe, 
2000), (Campa, 2006), (Lubatkin, 1987). This is a result of the nature of an 
acquisition. If the shares in the target company are bought completely or 
partially with cash, the acquirer typically has to pay a premium over the target 
company’s current share price to be able to acquire the shares. If, on the other 
hand, the acquisition is paid by stock in the acquiring company some of the 
sought after synergy gains are transferred to the owners of the target company.  
The payment method used is dependent on several factors that affect the 
perceived returns to the acquiring company. Such factors are the status of the 
target company (public/private, small/large), the financial state of the acquiring 
company and the voting control of its dominant shareholder (Faccio & Masulis, 
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2005). Another factor that also affects the returns to the target is the amount of 
managerial ownership in the target company. The higher the degree of 
managerial ownership is, the higher the returns to the target are. This 
relationship was found by Baugess et al., they also found that outside ownership 
has a negative relation with target returns. The reasons for this are takeover 
anticipation caused by high managerial ownership and outsiders’ willingness to 
share gains with the acquirer (Bauguess, 2009).  
 
2.4 Merger challenges 
There are several different ways for two companies to merge into one. Epstein 
differentiates between acquisitions, conglomerates and mergers. Acquisitions; 
where a significantly larger company buys a smaller one and assimilates it into 
its own organization, conglomerates; where a larger company owns several 
smaller ones without merging them together, and mergers; where two 
reasonably similarly sized companies come together and try to capture the best 
of the two companies to create a new, better company. According to Epstein 
mergers are much more difficult to do than the other two forms of acquisitions.  
(Epstein, 2004) 
Epstein states that most previous studies did not differentiate between the 
reasons for merger failure, and while some mergers fail because the strategic 
vision, fit or deal structure are poor, others fail because the post-merger 
integration process was poorly designed and implemented. This latter category 
of failed mergers is mergers that should have succeeded and it is these mergers 
Epstein has studied. 
Epstein identifies five key “drivers of successful post-merger integration”; 
integration strategy, integration team, communication, speed and aligned 
measurements, and states that failure on any of these can cause the merger to 
miss its goals. According to Epstein you must constantly emphasize that the 
merger is a merger of equals both in communication and in practice, and you 
must have an integration team consisting of members from both companies that 
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is backed by management. The integration must furthermore be carried out 
swiftly and measured against clearly defined and articulated measurements to 
verify that goals are being met. 
Although Epstein focuses on large corporations in his study the main conclusion 
that a successful post-merger integration is crucial for the overall merger 
success is still relevant to all mergers of equals no matter the size of the 
companies merging. 
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3 Recommendations on mergers 
This chapter focuses on the different recommendations on how mergers and 
acquisitions should be conducted based on the individual characteristics of each 
merger case. 
3.1 Choosing targets 
Makri et al. have studied how the degree of knowledge relatedness and 
technology complementarities of the target and the acquiring company affects 
the innovation rates and outcomes in mergers and acquisitions. According to 
Makri et al., earlier research by for example Cohen and Levinthal (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990), have found that a high degree of correlation between the 
buyers and the targets technological knowledge makes it easier to assimilate 
and commercially exploit the targets knowledge. However, if the correlation is 
too high it reduces the acquirer’s possibility to learn from the target. (Makri, 
2010)  
Capron and Shen’s study showed that acquirers prefer to buy private companies 
when they operate in the same business areas and public companies if they are 
acquiring in new business areas or if the target company has a high level of 
intangible assets. This stems from the fact that if the target company’s assets 
are intangible or its business is new to the acquirer, it is much more difficult for 
the acquirer to assess the value of the target. Consequently, if the target is 
public, the acquirer at least knows what the market think the value of the target 
is. Capron and Shen also found that the acquirer’s managers usually make the 
best decision possible within the constraints of the situation, and that a 
company that acquired a private firm fared better that if it had acquired a public 
firm, and vice versa. (Capron, 2007) 
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3.2 Merger advice based on merger types 
Some authors give advice on mergers that applies to all mergers where 
integration is desired (Galpin, 2008). Others divide mergers into distinct types 
and give different merger recommendations on each of these types (Lind, 2004), 
(Bower, 2001). It is only when a merger is conducted to achieve lower capital 
costs or to satisfy managers’ interests that no form of integration is necessary.  
Lind and Stevens have based their merger recommendation on a matrix based 
on the degree of goodwill and company disparity of the merger. With this matrix 
they have identified four distinct merger types. If both the merger goodwill and 
company disparity is low they call the merger type Merge & grow. If disparity is 
low but the merger has a high goodwill the merger type is called Plan & prosper. 
A merger with high disparity and high goodwill is called Stand & hold while a 
low goodwill, high disparity merger is named Segment & sell. (Lind, 2004) 
For each of these four merger types Lind and Stevens recommend a different 
merger approach. The most straightforward recommendations are given for a 
Segment & sell merger. This is a type of merger that should never have 
happened, since the two companies are completely different and the only way 
to save this merger is to either isolate the acquired company from the rest of 
the firm into an independent unit or to sell it off.  
For Merge and grow type of mergers the recommendations focus on quickly 
integrating the acquired company into the acquirer and on removing 
duplication. An example of this type of a merger is when a large company buys a 
smaller one as a means of growing market share or to expand into a new 
market. In these types of mergers the people of the acquired company are 
usually not that pleased with the situation, thus the merger has a very low 
goodwill. 
Service-based mergers typically fall into the Plan & prosper or the Stand & hold 
category depending on if their technologies, brands, markets and products are 
similar or not. As these types of mergers are conducted to broaden the services 
offered to customers or to acquire knowledge of new technologies goodwill is 
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often quite high. Much of the value of the companies lies in its people and the 
knowledge they possess, so the merger has to be done carefully not to cause 
key people to leave the company. Lind and Stevens recommend that mergers of 
service-based companies should initially be treated as Stand & hold mergers 
until it is sure that the firms really have a low disparity between them. After 
that, the key is to make people feel they are in control and let them make some 
choices regarding their work. Managers should refrain from giving too specific 
and strict instructions during the merger process. 
Bower (Bower, 2001) starts by defining five reasons that can be the driving force 
behind a merger, and then goes on to give examples of and recommendations 
for each one of them. The five reasons for mergers according to Bower are: 
overcapacity, geographic roll-up, product or market extension, R&D, and 
industry convergence.  
The overcapacity M&A occurs in mature industries that tend to be capital 
intensive, older sectors. The goal of these mergers is to increase the market 
share of the acquiring company by closing down less effective facilities of the 
new combined company. According to Bower, few of these mergers are 
successful because the acquiring company usually retains more of its own 
operations than that of its target. This leads to a substantial amount of bad-will 
among the acquired company’s people which makes it hard to get mixed teams 
to work effectively. On these types of mergers Bower only offers one advice: 
rationalize quickly. The merger won’t be easy and will likely be a one -time 
event. 
A geographical roll-up merger is when a company expands geographically by 
buying a similar company but still lets the operating units remain local. This has 
the benefits of giving the acquired company better resources while still 
retaining the local knowledge that it has. Geographical roll-ups are usually 
beneficial for both parties so they are easier to pull off than overcapacity 
mergers. The advice given here is to be extremely careful when introducing new 
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procedures and policies, in these types of mergers the acquirer can afford to go 
slowly. 
The third type mentioned is the product or market extension M&A. These 
mergers are aimed at extending a company’s product line or moving the 
company into a new country. In these mergers the acquirer has a greater chance 
of success the bigger it is compared to the target. When doing product or 
market extension mergers it is very important to know what you are buying as 
the targets processes can differ greatly from yours. 
A merger type common in the high-tech industry is the M&A as R&D. In this 
industry it is important to get a new product or technology out to the market 
fast. R&D mergers can be very difficult as the value in the target company often 
lies in its employees, and if they are not happy with the way the merger is 
conducted they might leave. This problem is emphasized by the need for speed 
so the recommendations here are to appoint executives with no other 
responsibilities to be in charge of the merger. 
The last merger type mentioned by Bower is the industry convergence M&A. In 
these mergers a company bets that it can realize substantial synergies by 
combining two industries. For these mergers, Bower recommends that 
subsidiaries should be allowed a high degree of freedom and that businesses 
should only be integrated when a specific opportunity appears. 
Drori et al. performed a case study on a “merger of equals” between two Israeli 
telecom companies. Their study targets the questions about how and why the 
participants in a merger of equals “enact, contest, or accept norms and 
practices of equality”. The findings in their study show that advertising a merger 
as a merger of equals serves as a measure of reducing conflicts and increasing 
acceptance of the merger among the employees. They also concluded that it is 
crucial for the new organization to apply a given practice of equality as the 
employees take note and keep count of actions they see only affecting 
employees from one of the merged companies. (Drori, 2011) 
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4 Case Ravensoft and Nordic Solutions 
In this chapter I present the two companies of this case study, Ravensoft and 
Nordic Solutions, along with the relevant data available before and after the 
merger. 
4.1 Company introductions 
4.1.1 Ravensoft 
Ravensoft was a small software business company that at the time of the 
merger negotiations had 22 employees. It was founded in 1997 by two partners, 
and in 1999 a third partner joined the company. From there on the company has 
grown gradually without any acquisitions. Later on the CEO at that time became 
a minority shareholder through a stock option program. The CEO left the 
company before the merger and at the time of the merger only three 
shareholders remained. Ravensoft was a Microsoft Certified Gold Partner, which 
means they qualified for the highest level of Microsoft partnership.   
Ravensoft had two offices, one in Helsinki, Finland, and one in Manchester, UK. 
The Manchester office focused on mobile development and was established in 
2007.  The Helsinki office was Ravensoft’s main office and it focused on 
Microsoft based software development. Ravensoft did project and consulting 
work for customers which consisted of small and larger companies, but it also 
had two products of its own: Green Snapper and Battery Extender. 
Green Snapper is a power saving application for workstations with which the 
administrator can set a timeframe for when the computers will be powered on 
or off. It also features statistics of the computers’ uptime and estimated 
achieved power savings. The other application, Battery Extender, is an 
application for Symbian phones which controls the different energy consuming 
components such as the GPS receiver and Bluetooth transmitter and turns them 
off when they are not used. 
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4.1.2 Nordic Solutions 
Nordic Solutions was a slightly larger company than Ravensoft, with 38 
employees at the time of the merger. The company was founded in 2001 by 
three partners. The first office was in Kuopio, the second office was founded in 
Helsinki in 2002. In 2004 the ownership structure of the company changed when 
the largest owner left the company and the other two original partners sold 30% 
of the company to key employees. At the time of the merger there were a total 
of 12 partners in Nordic Solutions. The company’s main source of revenue came 
from providing reporting services for customers as well as Oracle E-Business 
Suite solutions. 
Nordic Solutions also had two applications that it sold to customers, Armas and 
eMemo. eMemo is an application for electronic circulation and approval of 
general ledger vouchers that integrates directly into the customers’ own 
bookkeeping application, Armas is a solution for change management, 
automation and centralized reporting of user rights. 
4.2 Financial figures 
To be able to measure and compare some measurable data related to the 
merger’s performance, I have chosen a few measurements from both 
companies’ income statements. The measurements reflect some of the stated 
reasons for the merger such as cross selling, overhead costs and increased 
revenue. Because both companies are software business companies focused on 
service sales, their cost and revenue structure are quite similar.  
 
Nordic Solutions Oy 
 
Ravensoft Oy 
(Sums in 1000€) 2008 2009 Growth % 
 
2008 2009 Growth % 
Revenue 4453 3703 -16,84 % 
 
1619 2062 27,36 % 
Employee Cost -2284 -2581 13,00 % 
 
-881 -880 -0,11 % 
Facilities -211 -226 7,11 % 
 
-88 -98 11,36 % 
External 
services -12 0 -100,00 % 
 
-358 -604 68,72 % 
Profit/Loss 800 -46 -105,75 % 
 
-23 166 -821,74 % 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Employees 32 38 18,75 % 
 
17 17 0,00 % 
Table 1, Key financial figures for Nordic Solutions Oy and Ravensoft Oy for 2008-2009 
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In the year 2008, a year before the merger, Ravensoft’s revenue was 1.6 million 
euros while Nordic Solutions’ revenue was about 4.5 million euros. That year 
Ravensoft made a record loss of 23 thousand euros. For Nordic Solutions 2008 
went well and made a record profit of 800 thousand Euros. 
The next year the roles were reversed, the merger had already taken place but 
both companies still functioned as separate companies. The year 2009 turned 
out to be the worst year ever for Nordic Solutions while it proved to be the best 
year ever for Ravensoft. Nordic Solutions booked a loss of 46 thousand euros 
and Ravensoft a profit of 166 thousand euros. 
 
Combined 
   
(Sums in 1000€) 2008 2009 
Growth % 
2008-2009 2010 
Growth % 
2009-2010 
Revenue 6072 5765 -5,06 % 5419 -6,00 % 
Employee Cost -3165 -3461 9,35 % -3358 -2,98 % 
Facilities -299 -324 8,36 % -240 -25,93 % 
External 
services -370 -604 63,24 % -274 -54,64 % 
Profit/Loss 777 120 -84,56 % 58 -51,67 % 
 
  
   
  
Employees 49 55 12,24 % 60 9,09 % 
 
 
2011 
Growth % 
2010-2011 2012 
Growth % 
2011-2012 
Revenue 8818 62,72 % 10119 14,75 % 
Employee Cost -4040 20,31 % -5254 30,05 % 
Facilities N/A 
 
N/A   
External 
services -101 -63,14 % -320 216,83 % 
Profit/Loss 1086 1772,41 % 170 -84,35 % 
 
  
  
  
Employees 95 58,33 % 105 10,53 % 
Table 2, Combined key financial figures for Nordic Solutions Oy and Ravensoft Oy for the years 2008-
2012 
As can be seen in table 2, the combined revenue of the two companies shrunk 
both in 2009 and in 2010 compared to the previous year. This was attributed to 
the behavior of the customer companies of Nordic Solutions becoming more 
careful, and subsequently they bought fewer services from Nordic Solutions. 
The main reason for the buyers cautiousness was the overall decline of Finland’s 
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economy, measured by GDP, which started in the third quarter of 2009 (Official 
Statistics of Finland (OSF), 2009). Finland’s economy slowly started to grow 
again in the second quarter of 2010 but had still as of 2011 failed to reach the 
previous high levels of 2008 (Official Statistics of Finland (OSF), 2011). Although 
Ravensoft’s revenue grew in 2009, a large part of that growth came from work 
that Nordic Solutions did and was invoiced through Ravensoft. As is shown in 
table 1 Ravensoft’s external services costs increased  by 69% in 2009 as a direct 
result of this. This sum was about 240 k€ and thus inflates the combined 
revenue with as much. 
In 2011, the merged company grew on all measurements; revenue grew by over 
60%, profit by 1700% and the amount of employees by 58%. In 2012 the 
revenue and employee number growth continued, but the profits once again 
declined. 
Nordic Solutions’ average cost per employee calculated for the years 2008 -2009, 
was 71,500 euros; whereas Ravensoft’s average cost was 51,800 euros. This 
difference could be attributed to the fact that the employees at Ravensoft were 
on average younger than at Nordic Solutions, or to a proportionately larger 
amount of part time workers, but is nonetheless quite substantial. In the years 
2009-2010, after the merger, the average cost per employee came down to 
59,300 euros. Nordic Solutions later on established offices in Tallinn and Riga. 
This further brought down the average employee cost to 46,700 euros  in the 
years 2011-2012. I have used a two-year-average as the numbers for a single 
year can be heavily influenced by recruitments late in the year.  
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Picture 1, Official Statistics of Finland (OSF), Gross domestic product by quarter at reference year 2000 
prices, Available at:http://www.stat.fi/til/ntp/2011/02/ntp_2011_02_2011-09-05_tie_001_en.html, 
[Accessed on: 24.11.2011] 
Both Ravensoft and Nordic Solutions received a large portion of their revenue 
from only a few customers, and thus were very dependent on these accounts. 
For Nordic Solutions, the largest customer accounted for about 30 percent of 
the revenue, while the combined revenue of the five largest customers made up 
almost 80 percent of the total revenue in 2008. As for Ravensoft, the company 
had an even more concentrated revenue base with the single largest customer 
providing about 84 percent of the revenue. With revenue streams so highly 
concentrated both companies faced a huge risk in case their largest customers 
would stop buying their services.  
 
Nordic Solutions Oy Ravensoft Oy Combined 
 
2008 2008 2010 
Largest customer 28,38 % 84,00 % 30,37 % 
Five largest customers 79,56 % 99,00 % 73,07 % 
Table 3, Portion of revenue coming from the largest customer as well as from the five largest 
customers before and after the merger 
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5 Evaluation 
This chapter reviews the reasons and results of the mergers against the reasons 
stated by the stakeholders of the companies. 
5.1 Merger reasons 
From Nordic Solutions point-of-view, there were several reasons for the merger. 
Before the merger, Nordic Solutions was too small a company to participate in 
the bidding process for certain public projects where the bidders were required 
to have a certain amount of turnover (Matsi, 2013a). The acquisition of 
Ravensoft would boost the company size with about 50 percent which would 
open new possibilities for Nordic Solutions. This reason is coherent with the 
monopoly theory by Trautwein, where more market power is desired as a result 
of the merger. 
Another reason, which aligns with the synergy theory, stems from the fact that 
Nordic Solutions was focused on Oracle technology in their work, but at the 
same time all of their clients were using Microsoft technology for some part of 
their IT systems. Ravensoft, on the other hand, had specialized in Microsoft 
technology so there were apparent synergy effects to gain in the form of cross-
selling as well as in being able to provide services for a broader range of the IT 
system spectrum. (Matsi, 2013a) 
Closely related to the synergy theory, (McCann, 1996), found that the 
acquisition of expert talent is a prevailing reason for mergers in professional 
service firms. All of the respondents from Nordic Solutions stated that acquiring 
competence of Microsoft technologies was an important part of the reasons for 
the merger with Ravensoft. (Matsi, 2013a; Piippo, 2013; Voutilainen, 2013) 
Empire building theory, or hubris theory could potentially have influenced the 
merger decisions, as interviewees have stated that they wanted to grow the 
value of the company which could be interpreted as a desire to increase their 
own power (Matsi, 2013b), (Piippo, 2013), (Laurila, 2012). However, the fact 
    
 
25 
 
that all of the highest levels of managers in both companies were also the 
largest shareholders implicates that it is highly unlikely that they would act 
against the best interests of the shareholders, as they themselves would have 
had the most to lose in that case. 
In the year 2006, Ravensoft had grown into a company with yearly revenue of 
about 800 thousand euros, and at that time the management, who were at the 
same time owners, hired a CEO from outside the company in order to get more 
experience and resources for the management of the company. This decision 
was also influenced by the fact that all three of the owners had technical 
backgrounds and not managerial (Rosqvist, 2012). The goal was to grow further 
and the company also started the development of a product of its own, Green 
Snapper. After a few years the owners were not satisfied with the results and 
the CEO left the company. The owners discussed future financing needs with 
Gearshift Group, a management consulting firm, and realized that a 
combination of software services and product development in a single firm was 
a hindrance in getting funding for either part of the company. As the owners felt 
that they did not have the time or the resources required to further expand 
Ravensoft on their own, they asked Gearshift Group to search for potential 
buyers for the professional services part of the company (Laurila, 2012), 
(Rosqvist, 2012). Initially the owners of Ravensoft had planned to only sell off 
the professional services business while continuing working on Green Snapper, 
but they agreed to sell the whole company when Nordic Solutions made an offer 
to buy the whole company (Laurila, 2012). 
 
5.2 Target selection 
Even though the merger was advertised as a merger of equals, in practice 
Ravensoft Oy was bought by Nordic Solutions Oy. Therefore in this discussion 
Ravensoft will be attributed the role of target and Nordic Solutions the role of 
acquirer. 
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When gauging the selection of Ravensoft as the target for the merger against 
the findings of Makri et. al., it appears that Ravensoft was a good match for 
Nordic Solutions. Both companies operated in the software industry, and they 
mainly did project work for customers. This would imply that they had a high 
correlation between each other’s technological knowledge . According to (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990) a high degree of technological knowledge correlation makes 
it easier for the acquirer to exploit the target’s knowledge. Makri et. al., 
however, warn against choosing a target that uses too similar technologies as 
the acquirer as this reduces the acquirers chances to learn from the target. 
(Makri, 2010)  
One of the reasons for Nordic Solutions to choose Ravensoft was that Nordic 
Solutions wanted to acquire competence in Microsoft technologies (Matsi, 
2013a), (Voutilainen, 2013). This was both to be able to do more work for their 
existing Oracle customers as well as to reduce risk as Nordic Solutions would no 
longer be dependent on one single technology. Nordic Solutions also specifically 
searched for a company that worked in the software services field, like 
themselves, the logic being that it would be easier to integrate a more similar 
company than a company focusing, for example, solely on developing products 
(Voutilainen, 2013). As Microsoft and Oracle traditionally have focused on 
different applications for their technologies there was no significant overlap 
when acquiring a company that used Microsoft technologies. 
While Makri et. al. focused on technological compatibility between acquirer and 
target, Capron and Shen studied the problem of choosing an acquisition target 
from the point of a public vs. a private company. While they did find that a 
company usually makes the best choice possible, they did find that it is 
advantageous for a company that is buying a firm that operates in the same 
field as itself to choose a private company rather than a public. (Capron, 2007) 
In this sense Nordic Solutions made a good choice by acquiring a private 
company as Ravensoft operated in the same market segment as Nordic 
Solutions. Acquiring a private company was also, in practice, the only alternative 
for Nordic Solutions as public companies tend to be much larger, and hence, 
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more expensive than private ones. Nordic Solutions also found Ravensoft to be 
of an appropriate size relative to the acquirer, as Ravensoft was roughly half the 
size of Nordic Solutions. Hence, the buyer thought that the integration of the 
acquired employees would not be a big problem (Voutilainen, 2013). 
 
5.3 Acquirer selection 
After Ravensoft had given Gearshift Group the task of searching for a buyer for 
Ravensoft, Gearshift Group initially made a long list of about 20 possible 
companies that were contacted. After contacting these 20 companies the 
possible buyers were narrowed down to six. Ravensoft’s management then met 
with the management of these companies, signed non-disclosure agreements 
and presented their company to the possible buyers. From this group of 
companies, Ravensoft received two offers, and the offers were made public to 
all of the six companies. Ravensoft chose the offer made by Nordic Solutions 
due to several reasons. During negotiations the management identified several 
synergies that could be had if the two companies merged. One was that both 
companies had different customers so cross-selling to each other’s customers 
could prove valuable; this was further emphasized by the fact that the core 
competencies of the two companies differed as Nordic Solutions was focused on 
Oracle technology and Ravensoft on Microsoft technology. These technologies 
were complementary in the sense that many of Nordic Solutions’ customers 
used Oracle technology to host servers and databases, but still had Microsoft 
operating systems on the servers and workstations. Another sought after 
benefit was the larger size of the combined company, as it was thought that this 
would make the company more appealing both as an employer and as a 
business partner. The last mentioned synergy effect was the better 
infrastructure and management of a larger company that would allow a better 
consultant to management ratio. (Laurila, 2012), (Rosqvist, 2012) 
Before Gearshift Group started to search for a buyer, they discussed the 
possible valuation of Ravensoft with its owners. A commonly used valuation in 
    
 
28 
 
these types of transactions is 3-4 times the yearly profit. The owners of 
Ravensoft also discussed with the potential buyers about how the payment 
would be done: only cash, only stock or by a combination of both. In the final 
merger deal with Nordic Solutions a formula based on Ravensoft’s revenue and 
profit was used to determine the price paid, with the owners additionally 
receiving stock in Nordic Solutions later on. A portion of the payment was tied 
to Ravensoft’s profit for the year 2009, and a smaller portion was dependent on 
the combined company’s revenue 2010. As Ravensoft’s owners acquired stock in 
the acquiring company as part of the deal, and as they wanted to expand the 
company and further develop their business, it was only natural that they had to 
evaluate the buying company’s business, and not only the offer they gave.  
(Laurila, 2012), (Rosqvist, 2012) 
 
5.4 Payment 
As Fuller et. al showed in their study, the way in which the acquired company is 
paid for has a very large impact on both the returns to the acquirer as well as on 
the returns to the target (Fuller, 2002). Even though it can be shown that a 
specific type of payment is the best decision in a particular case, other factors 
also affect the decision of whether the payment should be made with cash, 
stocks, or a combination of both. The acquirer’s financial situation and the 
voting rights of its owners are examples of factors that might influence the type 
of payment used (Faccio & Masulis, 2005). 
In this acquisition, Nordic Solutions decided to use a combination of cash and 
stock to pay for the acquired firm. This decision was done for several reasons; 
one was that the owners of Nordic Solutions did not want to pay exclusively 
with stock, as this would have considerably diluted their own ownership in the 
company (Voutilainen, 2013). This decision correlates with (Faccio & Masulis, 
2005) findings that when the largest shareholder owns between 20% and 60% of 
the company, they are likely to choose cash over stock as payment in order to 
not lose control of the company. Nordic Solutions’ two largest shareholders 
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owned 25.5% each of the company, and the third largest owner owned 20% of 
Nordic Solutions (Matsi, 2013b). The buyers also acknowledged that if you 
believe that you can improve the target company’s business, it is better to not 
pay exclusively with stocks as you are then sharing your future profits with the 
sellers. 
Nordic Solutions did also not want to pay exclusively with cash, for two different 
reasons; one was purely financial. Nordic Solutions did not seek debt financing, 
and thus paying the whole acquisition with cash would have resulted in a 
weakened financial position which was seen as a too big risk (Voutilainen, 
2013). The other reason for paying part of the payment with stocks was that 
Nordic Solutions wanted to commit the sellers, who also worked as managers in 
Ravensoft, to their new company (Piippo, 2013), (Voutilainen, 2013). The 
merger deal also included a clause requiring the three previous owners to work 
for Nordic Solutions for at least two years after the merger (Laurila, 2012), 
(Voutilainen, 2013).  
As the contract between the sellers and the buyers was classified, I was not able 
to include the precise amounts of money and stock that were given to the 
sellers in exchange for their shares in Ravensoft, and thus, I could not estimate 
if the acquirer overpaid or not. But, according to Matsi, the sellers’ asking price 
was lower and more realistic than those of other small companies that Nordic 
Solutions had come across. (Matsi, 2013a) 
 
5.5 Merger steps 
The merger between Nordic Solutions and Ravensoft can be characterized as a 
service-based merger, as described by Lind and Stevens (Lind, 2004). These 
mergers are done to acquire new customers and/or new knowledge. In the case 
of Nordic Solutions and Ravensoft, both acquiring new customers and acquiring 
new knowledge were stated reasons for the merger (Matsi, 2013b), 
(Voutilainen, 2013), (Piippo, 2013). For these kind of mergers, Lind and Stevens 
recommend that service-based mergers should at first be treated as stand & 
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hold mergers, and later on as plan & prosper mergers. This means that you 
should not initially make big changes but rather let the employees get used to 
the situation before merging teams and relocating employees.   
Before the merger deal was made, a due diligence review of the combined 
company was done, and a business plan for the future was made. These were 
done together by the management of the two companies based on the 
assumption that the merger deal would be made. No documented merger plan 
was made, all the planning of the various merger steps were done more or less 
informally. (Laurila, 2012), (Matsi, 2013b), (Voutilainen, 2013) 
The deal was signed on a Friday, and the employees of the two companies were 
informed about the coming merger the next Monday. It was emphasized that 
the goal of the merger was not to reduce costs by making employees redundant. 
(Laurila, 2012) 
The first step in the practical arrangements was co-location. Ravensoft’s Helsinki 
office moved in with Nordic Solutions’ Espoo office , within half-a-year after the 
merger deal. Before that a few people from Ravensoft had already begun 
working on projects with employees from Nordic Solutions. At this point the 
employees of the two companies still retained their previous managers even 
though in some cases this led to a matrix organization; an employee could have 
both an administrative manager and a manager who managed the employee’s 
daily work. 
The second step was moving Ravensoft’s employees’ computer and mail 
accounts to Nordic Solution’s infrastructure. In conjunction with this all 
Ravensoft employees salaries started to get paid by Nordic Solutions. 
From the beginning of 2010 the company was restructured so that the CEO and 
the secretaries were employed by Nordic Solutions Oy and all the other 
employees were employed by Nordic Solutions Consulting Oy (old Ravensoft 
Oy). Nordic Solutions Oy thus became a holding company that owned 100 
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percent of the stock in Nordic Solutions Consulting Oy. This was done to 
minimize the taxes associated with the merger. (Matsi, 2013a) 
In 2010, a year after the merger, an employee survey was conducted about the 
employees’ wellbeing at work. The survey contained a few questions about the 
recent merger. A question asking if employees thought that the merger had 
been handled well got an average rating of 4.03 on a scale from 1 to 6 with 1 
being “I completely disagree” and 6 being “I completely agree”, only 4 people 
out of 34 gave a 1 or a 2. A question stating “I now feel that we all are the same 
company” got an average of 3.79, but here the spread of the answers was 
greater. In a free form question of what the employees felt that still had to be 
done for the merger to be complete the feeling of still belonging to the two 
original companies was addressed, as there had not been any effort to actively 
mix the existing teams by moving people around. Overall employee satisfaction 
was quite good, and it was not mentioned that the merger would have made 
anything worse. (Tapiola, 2010) 
 
5.6 Merger challenges 
When asked about what the challenges were for the merger, the most frequent 
answer was the challenge of fitting together of two different company cultures; 
this was mentioned by all the interviewees. Although both companies were 
fairly young companies and both worked in the software industry, the average 
employee for the two companies differed quite a lot from each other. Ravensoft 
had younger employees who were more technically oriented whereas Nordic 
Solution had somewhat older employees that worked more in consulting roles, 
and thus had more process knowledge. Employees were referred to as being 
from Ravensoft or Nordic Solution for quiet long, both by other employees as 
well as by management. Management tried to assign people from both 
companies to work on the same projects to facilitate integration, but it was 
complicated due to there being only few similarities in the work done by the 
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two companies. (Matsi, 2013b), (Rosqvist, 2012), (Laurila, 2012), (Voutilainen, 
2013), (Piippo, 2013) 
Another challenge mentioned was that it proved difficult to achieve all the 
perceived benefits of the merger. The most prominent of these was the buyer’s 
hope to use the newly acquired Microsoft expertise to be able to sell more 
services to the company’s existing customers. (Voutilainen, 2013), (Piippo, 
2013) 
Although it was not mentioned as a challenge to the merger process, both the 
CEO of Ravensoft and the CEO of Nordic Solutions said that in retrospect, the 
merger process could have been documented better and executed more 
according to a plan. The merger was carried out more or less based on the gut 
feelings of the parties involved and as the process was not documented it was 
not possible to follow up on how the merger was proceeding. If the process 
would have been more clearly defined, the benefits of the merger could have 
been realized earlier. (Laurila, 2012), (Matsi, 2013a) 
 
5.7 Immediate merger results 
The merged company had an employee count of 60 immediately after the 
merger, and it has since continued to grow. The only mentioned goal in terms of 
numbers was that the company’s revenue should be 10% larger in 2010 than 
that of the combined revenue of the two separate companies in 2009. As can be 
seen from Table 1, this goal was not met as the amount of revenue decreased in 
2010; this decline was seen as an indirect result to the recession in Finland’s 
economy that started in 2009. Due to the decline in revenue and profit, 
employee co-operation negotiations were held that resulted in a reduction of 
the number of employees by three. (Matsi, 2010) 
Another immediate effect of the merger was that Nordic Solutions was able to 
sell consultancy work to Ravensoft’s largest customer for a total of about 240 
thousand euros, thus confirming that the sought after cross-selling synergies 
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existed. This extra revenue helped Nordic Solutions’ result in the year 2009, 
which would otherwise have been much lower. Another positive effect of the 
merger was when Ravensoft’s largest customer at the time of the merger 
stopped buying services from Nordic Solutions in 2012 due to a shift in their 
technology focus. If Ravensoft would have been functioning as an independent 
company this would have had much more serious consequences than it now 
had. 
In the beginning of 2010, the employees working in the old Ravensoft office 
moved to the Nordic Solutions office in Espoo, which resulted in savings of 84 
thousand euros a year compared to 2009, thus reducing facilities costs by 26%, 
compared to an increase of 8% the previous year. 
 
5.8 Merger performance 
As both the merging companies were privately owned, and the merged 
company still is, stock based metrics such as CAR cannot be used in evaluating 
the performance of the merger. Thus, merger performance can only be 
evaluated by accounting based metrics and subjective assessments.  
When looking at the revenue and employee count for the combined companies 
before the merger (2008) and three years after the merger (2012) it is clear that 
the value of the company has increased as the revenue has increased by 66% 
and the number of employees by 114%. While the profits have fluctuated, it is 
still clear that the criteria that the merger should increase the company 
valuation (Piippo, 2013) has been fulfilled. The management has not separately 
calculated what portion of the revenue and profits stem from the acquired 
business (Piippo, 2013), (Voutilainen, 2013). Thus it is not possible to determine 
if the merger has increased the earning potential of the business of the old 
Ravensoft. 
As most of the buyers and sellers worked in the merging companies, one can 
assume that they have very good insight into the actual performance of the 
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merger, and as such, provide valuable information about it. Both the sellers’ and 
the buyers’ were asked about their opinions on how well the merger had been 
conducted, while focusing on their respective situations. 
The interviewed sellers both said that they were pleased with the compensation 
they got and with the performance of the merged company. According to them, 
they got a good compensation for the time and effort they had put into building 
Ravensoft into the company it was at the time of the acquisition.  Apart from the 
compensation the sellers were very pleased with being part of the new 
company with access to larger projects and with the ability to provide more 
services to the existing customers. They also thought that the merger brought 
the stability and benefits of a larger employer to the employees, as well as given 
them more options for personal development. Laurila also states that he thinks 
this was a merger in which everyone won. (Laurila, 2012), (Rosqvist, 2012) 
The representatives of the former Nordic Solutions also stated that they were 
pleased with the result of the merger; however, they were less enthusiastic in 
their wording than the sellers. Phrases like “it didn’t go great, but”, “we weren’t 
able to take advantage of everything that we had thought” and “the integration 
didn’t happen as quickly as we had hoped” were used when asked about 
whether the buyer side was satisfied with the acquisition.  Of the stated goals 
for the merger, one in particular did not work out as envisioned; being able to 
successfully utilize Ravensoft’s Microsoft knowledge in selling additional 
services to Nordic Solutions’ existing Oracle clients.  According to Voutilanen, 
Nordic Solutions’ owners did not express any dissatisfaction about the 
acquisition, and he believes the buyer would do the same decision again and 
that the company acquired very competent employees from Ravensoft. Piippo 
emphasized that the merger increased the company’s revenue and reputation, 
and brought in new customers. (Matsi, 2013b), (Piippo, 2013), (Voutilainen, 
2013) 
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6 Summary and Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to investigate whether merger reasons are the 
same for small companies in the software business as they are for larger 
companies, and to evaluate how well merger goals are met in these cases. The 
study was conducted through a case study by studying the merger of two 
privately held small companies in the software industry: Nordic Solutions and 
Ravensoft. 
When reviewing the stated reasons for the merger from the acquirer against the 
facts, it would seem that Nordic Solutions and Ravensoft were a good fit for 
each other for several reasons. 
 Their technologies were similar, but not overlapping, and they 
functioned as complementary technologies for each other.  
 The combined company’s product portfolio and service offering was 
broadened significantly after the merger. 
  The companies did not share any customers, so the possibility of cross-
selling was apparent, especially as all of Nordic Solutions customers used 
Microsoft technology in some form.  
 With the merger Nordic Solutions acquired experts on Microsoft 
technology which they would otherwise have had to recruit one-by-one.  
 The owners of both companies wanted their company to grow, both for 
the sake of not letting the company stagnate as well as for being able to 
compete in bigger tenders, where company size might be a criterion. 
Ravensoft’s owners, as sellers, did not mention quite as many reasons, but they 
expressed that they felt they did not have the time or resources to further 
develop their company and thus wanted to gain the resources and support of a 
larger company to be able to grow further. They also sought managerial 
competence and a better company infrastructure from the buyer. 
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The reasons for this merger aligns very well with the findings of previous studies 
on mergers and acquisitions, and in this case the predominant reasons were 
gaining synergy effects in sales, building market power and acquiring new 
competence. For small and medium size companies in Finland, such as Nordic 
Solutions and Ravensoft, empire building and hubris of the managers is not an 
issue as the managers are usually the largest shareholders (Lappalainen, 2012). 
As the buyers did not set very specific goals for the merger, it is difficult to say 
whether these goals were filled or not. The synergy effects from cross selling 
were initially very positive, but eventually they did not live up to the 
expectations set for them. Nordic Solutions was not able to sell as much 
Microsoft consultancy work to their previous customers as they had hoped to.  
During the first two years, the revenue did not increase as envisioned; however, 
later on it started to grow again and surpassed the previous numbers. Although 
cost savings were not mentioned as an independent reason, sought after 
synergy effects suggest some savings were to be had. Initially there were some 
savings on facilities costs due to the merging of Ravensoft’s Helsinki office with 
Nordic Solutions’ Espoo office. Nordic Solutions’ also acquired cheaper 
employees from Ravensoft based on the average cost per employee. 
Subjectively, both the sellers and the buyers stated they were pleased with the 
merger. The sellers thought that they had been fairly compensated in the deal, 
and that they now could be a part of a larger company with better potential to 
grow. The buyers expressed that they got the Microsoft expertise they sought 
after; they boosted their growth, and had the possibility to compete in bigger 
tenders. 
The merger process was not critically hindered by any major issues, and 
although the most frequently mentioned challenge was fitting together two 
cultures, this, in retrospect, did not turn out to be a major issue. According to 
the employee satisfaction survey, the employees were not dissatisfied with the 
merger; this was further corroborated by employee turnover not being higher 
than usual after the merger. The obvious worst case scenario would have been 
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many employees leaving the company, which would have had a severe negative 
effect on the merger results. 
While both the buyers and the sellers were satisfied with the merger, both 
parties were, in retrospect, of the opinion that the merger should have been 
planned better, with tasks for what needed to be done assigned to individual 
people. Clearer, more measurable goals should also have been set up so that 
that could have been followed up on so that corrective measures could have 
been taken if needed. 
In conclusion I think that the initial setting could have provided for a very 
successful merger, but that a significant part of the potential was lost because 
of poor merger execution planning. Overall I would still say that the merger was 
a success, as all of the parties involved were satisfied, the company has since 
grown significantly, and no large portion of the employees left the company 
after the merger. 
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8  Appendices 
8.1 Appendix 1, Interview guide for Nordic Solutions owners 
8.1.1 Yhdistymisestä 
 Etsikö NS ostettavaa 
 Miksi haluttiin ostaa Ravensoft 
 Mitkä olivat tavoitteet 
 Miten arvioitiin kannattavuus 
 Miten määritettiin hinta 
 Miten osto rahoitettiin 
 Miten osto maksettiin 
 Oliko ehtoja ostossa 
 Milloin osto tehtiin 
 Oliko päätös yksimielinen 
 Missä roolissa toimit yhdistymisessä 
 Miten yhdistymistä valmisteltiin 
 Miten yhdistymistä suunniteltiin 
 Miksi kaksi yhtiötä, Nordic Solutions Oy ja Nordic Solutions Consulting Oy 
8.1.2 Yhdistymisen jälkeen 
 Täyttyivätkö tavoitteet 
 Mitkä olivat suurimmat haasteet 
 Olitteko tyytyväinen tulokseen 
 Onko asioita joihin ette olleet tyytyväisiä  
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8.2 Appendix 2, Interview guide for Ravensoft owners 
8.2.1 Yhdistymisestä 
 Miksi haluttiin myydä Ravensoft 
 Etsikö Ravensoft ostajaa 
 Miten määritettiin hinta 
 Mitkä olivat tavoitteet 
 Oliko ehtoja myynnissä 
 Oliko päätös yksimielinen 
 Miten yhdistymistä valmisteltiin 
 Miten yhdistymistä suunniteltiin 
 Missä roolissa toimit yhdistymisessä 
8.2.2 Yhdistymisen jälkeen 
 Täyttyivätkö tavoitteet 
 Mitkä olivat suurimmat haasteet 
 Olitteko tyytyväinen tulokseen 
 
